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In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d
27 (Del. 2006)
Justice Hillary A. Sale delivered the opinion of the court
In August 1995, The Walt Disney Company entered into an employment agreement
with Michael Ovitz. The terms of the agreement provided that Ovitz would become
the company president and serve in that role for ﬁve years. Yet a short fourteen
months later, the company terminated Ovitz without cause. The severance payment
was valued at $130 million.
Whether – and how – the board of directors, together with Michael Eisner (Chief
Executive Ofﬁcer) and Sanford Litvack (Executive Vice President and General
Counsel), made those decisions have been the subject of considerable public
speculation. These questions are at the core of this matter, which presents the appeal
of a post-trial opinion of the shareholder derivative actions. The Chancery Court
ruled on several pre-trial opinions, one of which was appealed to this Court, resulting
in a trial. After a 37-day trial, the Chancellor issued an opinion ﬁnding that the
plaintiffs had failed to meet the requisite standard of proof for a derivative challenge
based on either a breach of ﬁduciary duties or waste against the board and Eisner,
Litvack, and Ovitz. Despite our serious misgivings about the directors’ actions and
approach – namely the one-off and non-inclusive decision-making atmosphere, the
composition of the board in terms of its lack of gender diversity (for example), and
the actions of Eisner, Ovitz, and Litvack as outlined below – we ultimately agree with
the Chancery Court and uphold its ﬁndings.
I

This case has its roots in the approach of a CEO who faced health issues and wanted
to control his succession (and maybe his successor). The board, which appears to
have been well-stocked with primarily male friends of the CEO, and which operated
a bit like the type of private men’s clubs that have been on the wane for many years
now,1 went along with the CEO’s proposal, raising few questions about the strategy,
For example, lawsuits and other pressure resulted in changes to the granting of alcohol licenses that
essentially made it impossible for private clubs that did not allow certain groups (like women to
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compensation, or execution. This is what happens when a board lacks diversity and
the creative friction that diversity creates. It is what happens when a board has fewer
than three women on it, and it is what happens when the CEO decides to hire a
friend with whom he has had a social relationship for over twenty-ﬁve years – and
over whom he believes he can exercise control.2 Nevertheless, these choices,
although inconsistent with good corporate governance, arguably careless, and possibly even lacking in emotional intelligence, do not amount to actions not taken in
good faith – at least not unless we are prepared to rule that a board that is virtually all
male itself lacks good faith. Therefore, these choices are not ones for which we can
impose liability, no matter how tempted we might be.
A
In order to understand the decision, it is best if we begin with a description of the
process and players. Michael Eisner, the chair and CEO, was good friends with
Michael Ovitz, who had a long history with the Creative Artists Agency (CAA), in
which he was a founding partner. CAA was a privately held premier Hollywood
talent agency, controlled by Ovitz and Ron Meyer. In April 1994, after Eisner had a
heart attack and realized that he might not live forever, he spent time thinking about
a potential successor and focused on Ovitz, a friend of twenty-ﬁve years. Ovitz, in
turn, had just learned that his co-founder was leaving CAA for a position that Ovitz
had wanted, thus making it unpalatable for Ovitz to remain at CAA. At the time,
Eisner had been president of Disney for only three months, having succeeded Frank
Wells, who had died in a helicopter crash a year earlier.3 Following Wells’s death,
Disney created a shortlist of potential internal successors (and no external candidates) but found none of them viable. Thus, Eisner assumed the presidency.4
In the spring of 1995, after initial discussions between Eisner and Ovitz, and
apparently little consultation with the board of directors,5 Eisner reached out to
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become full-ﬂedged members and to serve alcohol. See, e.g., Anti Bias Rules Could Open
Private Club’s Doors, Bos. Herald, May 20, 1992, at 061; John W. Frece, Clubs that
Discriminate Could Lose Liquor Licenses, Balt. Sun (Mar. 30, 1994), https://www
.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-03-30-1994089063-story.html.
It may also be symptomatic of the entertainment industry’s business model that undervalues
women – and a company that is famous for perpetuating gender stereotypes and overemphasizes female characters’ physical appearance. See, e.g., Mia Adessa Towbin et al., Images of
Gender, Race, Age, and Sexual Orientation in Disney Feature-Length Animated Films, 15 J.
Feminist Fam. Therapy 19 (2004). In more than half of such ﬁlms, Disney also fails to feature
at least two women who talk to each other about something other than a man – a test widely
known as the “Bechdel test,” named after the American cartoonist Alison Bechdel, in whose
1985 comic strip Dykes to Watch Out For the test ﬁrst appeared. Alison Bechdel, Dykes to
Watch Out for (1986).
In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 699 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing Tr.
4148:11–4150:5).
Id. (citing Tr. 3997:24–3999:4; see also 6025:7–19).
Eisner did discuss the Ovitz possibility with Roy Disney (a director) and Sid Bass, who were two
of the company’s largest shareholders.
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Irwin Russell, an entertainment lawyer who was Eisner’s personal attorney and the
chair of Disney’s Compensation Committee, to strike a deal. Russell negotiated with
Ovitz’s attorney and was told, but did not verify, that Ovitz was making between $20 and
$25 million per year from CAA and owned 55 percent of the company. Ovitz insisted
that he would not give up that ownership interest without downside protection.
When Russell had put together the basic terms of Ovitz’s agreement, he provided
a case study of it to both Eisner and Ovitz. Russell noted that the compensation
seemed extraordinary, stating that the proposed salary was at a very high level for any
corporate ofﬁcer and higher than Eisner’s. He further noted that the stock option
grant exceeded Disney’s standards and would be subject to criticism. His words fell
on (tone) deaf ears, and the case study was not provided to any other board member.
Due to Disney’s policy against front-loading contracts, Russell and Eisner looked for
other ways to provide Ovitz with downside protection. When considering his compensation, however, the compensation committee did not consider Ovitz’s agreement with
Ron Meyer and Bill Haber to transfer their interests in CAA in exchange for 75 percent
of the next four years’ revenues. The negotiations resulted in a salary of $1 million and a
bonus (which Ovitz was told would be approximately $7.5 million annually) with a very
lucrative multi-year option package – which would allow Ovitz to receive payments
even if he was ﬁred for reasons other than gross negligence or malfeasance. Disney also
agreed to purchase Ovitz’s personal jet for $187,000 more than its appraised value, his
BMW at acquisition cost and not its depreciated market value, and his computers at
replacement value instead of book value.
In Russell’s opinion, it was “appropriate to provide Ovitz with downside protection and upside opportunity” – even if all of the risk of the arrangement were
transferred to Disney. Indeed, Russell apparently felt that regardless of the anticipated “very strong criticism,” Disney needed to address the “lifestyle challenges”
Ovitz would face when leaving CAA’s considerable cash compensation and perquisites, because at Disney, a public company, the cash compensation would be lower.
As the facts make clear, Disney was very willing to offer up that protection, even
though when Ovitz negotiated to leave CAA, he transferred his interests with an
agreement for an exchange of revenues over a multi-year period, subject to some
ﬁnancial benchmarks. It was unclear that Ovitz would receive the projected revenues or even whether CAA would be proﬁtable in his absence; therefore, arguably,
this potential compensation should not have been considered. Nevertheless, the
record indicates that the Disney Compensation Committee did not consider the
tentativeness of this arrangement.
Although Russell conducted all the initial negotiations on his own, he did consult
other experts, notably all men, but “only after there was a good possibility of a deal”
and the “ﬁnancial terms of the OEA [were] sufﬁciently concrete.”6 He engaged
Graef Crystal, a compensation consultant, and Ray Watson, another member of the
6

907 A.2d at 704 n.40, 704.

4

In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)

compensation committee, in the process. Crystal’s report, however, was presented
after extensive discussion between the three men, working through “various assumptions and manipulat[ing] inputs in order to generate a series of values” attributable to
the agreement.7 The report highlighted the low-risk, high-return aspect of the
package, to which Crystal was “philosophically opposed.” Most concerning to
Crystal was the $50 million option appreciation guarantee, with an in-the-money
windfall available at the end of ﬁve years. Russell raised these concerns to Eisner
alone, who stated that he did not read the package the same way and pushed back.
As a result, Crystal revised his views in part, but remained concerned about the
overall size of the compensation package, which, notably, was larger than that of any
public company ofﬁcer at the time. Crystal’s revised report was completed six days
after the original memo and four days after the letter agreement (“OLA”) was signed
and the press release issued.
During the same week, Eisner spoke with Ovitz and worked through proposed
“titles” and what turned out to be signiﬁcant opposition from key Disney ofﬁcers.
Ovitz apparently believed that he and Eisner would be equals and co-CEOs, but
Eisner was not interested in sharing his title as Chair. In addition, Sanford Litvack,
who was General Counsel, and Steve Bollenbach, who was Chief Financial Ofﬁcer,
were both opposed to Ovitz’s hire. They felt privileged not just to express that view
but also to demand that they not report to Ovitz. The record indicates that Litvack
believed that he should be getting the job and resented Ovitz.8 Bollenbach’s reasons
for opposing Ovitz were less clear. Bollenbach’s “testimony seemed
disingenuous . . . when he pinned his resistance on the fact that he had been part
of a cohesive trio.”9 His testimony emphasizes the degree of privilege the male
leaders of Disney exhibited. The result was that Eisner went back to Ovitz to tell him
that he would become the president but not the chief operating ofﬁcer, and that two
of Disney’s key ofﬁcers would continue to report to Eisner. With “his back against
the wall,” and despite the “mutiny,” Ovitz agreed to accept the conditions.10
A mere two days following Crystal’s original memo and only four days after
contacting Watson, Eisner and Ovitz signed the OLA, which was made public that
day.11 Eisner then proceeded to inform the rest of the compensation committee and
the board, by phone and individually, although it remains unclear whether he
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Id. at 704.
Id. at 706–07.
Id.
Id. at 707.
Making the OLA public only furthered Eisner’s overconﬁdence that Ovitz was the right
candidate and that his compensation was appropriate. J. Edward Russo & Paul J. H.
Schoemaker, Managing Overconﬁdence, MIT Sloan Mgmt. Rev., Jan. 1992, at 12 (“[W]e
often lean toward one perspective, and the natural tendency is to seek support for our initial
view rather than to look for disconﬁrming evidence.”)
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discussed the terms (as opposed to the decision).12 During the same period, an
attorney at Disney worked to translate the terms into actual compensation and
discovered that the tax implications were problematic. As a result, Russell, and not
the committee, concluded they should eliminate the provision guaranteeing the $50
million option appreciation and revised it to achieve the back-end guarantee.
More than a month later, the compensation committee met to address multiple
Disney compensation issues, including Ovitz’s agreement. The meeting lasted one
hour. Crystal’s analysis and concerns, including that there were no public company
presidents with compensation comparable to Ovitz’s, were not provided to the
committee. Indeed, the committee was given only Watson’s analysis, which used a
different methodology. Crystal testiﬁed that he was available by phone, but no-one
called – likely because they did not receive his report. In addition to voting to
compensate Ovitz at this meeting, the committee voted to pay Russell for his
negotiations and work on Ovitz’s compensation over the prior month, at the rate
of $250,000.13
Next, the full board, which had only one female member, convened in executive
session, where it learned of the unique reporting structure but not of the concerns of
Bollenbach and Litvack. Eisner led the discussion, and Watson and Russell
responded to questions. Then, the board voted unanimously to elect Ovitz as
President; however, it was not until almost three weeks later that the Disney
Compensation Committee actually approved the terms of Ovitz’s employment
agreement (OEA) and Ovitz’s option award.

B
Ovitz ofﬁcially became President on October 1, 1995, and it quickly became
apparent that he was not going to succeed. Indeed, within months, the disconnect
between Ovitz and his style versus that of Disney – and public companies more
generally – became painfully obvious. From the beginning, the Ovitz–Litvack–
12

13

Delaware courts have criticized this kind of informal process. See, e.g., Cellular Info. Sys., Inc.
v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1995) (emphasizing the importance of board formality
and the group dynamics of board action in corporate law: “Formality in such circumstances is
not ‘mere formality,’ but is treated by courts as important because it tends to focus attention on
the need for deliberation and the existence of accountability structures. With respect to group
dynamics, it is an old rule that boards may act with legal effect only at duly convened meetings
at which a quorum is present. Again, functional reasons underlie the law’s insistence on correct
form. See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 110–112 (1986).”)
Although board members are sometimes compensated for taking on considerable extra work, at
best this is an odd situation. If Disney needed outside counsel to negotiate with Ovitz, the far
better practice would have been for the company to hire counsel rather than using a member of
the board. Eisner and Russell created the impression that Russell was being enriched through
his relationship with the company. Nevertheless, $250,000, while a very signiﬁcant sum of
money to most of us, was – to a Hollywood entertainment lawyer like Russell – presumably not
sufﬁcient to call his judgment into question.
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Bollenbach situation operated with tension, with Ovitz struggling to accept the
agreed-upon reporting structure. Further, within a month of starting in the role,
Litvack began to complain about Ovitz’s aggressive style, and Eisner indicated that
the relationship might not improve.
When the January 1996 corporate retreat occurred, the challenges became even
more apparent. At a Disney resort in Florida, the group engaged in activities and
visits to the parks, with group transportation by bus. Ovitz, however, refused to ride
the bus with Eisner and others, insisting on a limousine. He also declined to
participate in activities and made inappropriate demands of park employees. In
short, Ovitz declined to be part of the group or the culture.
This individualistic approach continued, and the relationship with Eisner began
to deteriorate such that by the summer of 1996, Eisner had spoken with multiple
directors about Ovitz’s failure to adapt to Disney’s culture. One board member,
Gary Wilson, said that when he went cycling in France with Eisner and Ovitz in
June of 1996, he realized that the rumors were true and there was a problem with
Ovitz assimilating into the company.
Thus, by the fall of 1996, just over one year after the initial hiring discussions, the
board members shifted gears and began to focus on whether to terminate Ovitz,
responding to what they were hearing internally and externally. The media was
reporting on tensions within the team, including an article based on an interview
with Bollenbach. Eisner told the board that he “did not trust” Ovitz, noting noncompliance with expense policies and other concerns.14 Litvack said the same and
complained of “spin” and being “handled.” Ovitz, of course, told a different story.
He complained of Eisner’s micro-managing and explained that his inability to get
things done or gain traction at Disney was due to his different philosophy.
Once again, Eisner took matters into his own hands. First, he sent Litvack to tell
Ovitz that Eisner no longer supported or wanted him at Disney. Ovitz responded
that if Eisner wanted him out, he “could tell him so to his face.”15 Second, after this
childish approach failed, Eisner urged a “trade” to Sony. This too failed.
The board as a whole did not discuss the deteriorating relationship with Ovitz.
Instead, Eisner spoke with some but not all members, relaying concerns and
challenges. He also wrote a letter stating that if he were to be hit by a truck, Ovitz
should not be named CEO, noting erratic behavior and pathological problems. But
only Russell and Watson saw this letter.
Eisner’s public comments, however, were in stark contrast. For example, both
Eisner and Ovitz appeared on Larry King’s show and refuted the rumors about their
relationship and Ovitz’s position. Eisner even stated that “[i]f given the chance, he
would hire Ovitz again.”16 These comments certainly appear to be a shameless
14
15
16

907 A.2d at 720.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 726.
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attempt to cover the real situation and – although this is not a court that addresses
federal securities law – might well be in the zone of securities fraud.
C
As the situation progressed, it became clear that Ovitz would not exit and make the
problem go away. Eisner then began to press for termination, and he asked Litvack
about the grounds for doing so. Litvack revisited the agreement, refreshing his
understanding of “malfeasance” and “gross negligence.”17 He reviewed the facts of
which he was aware (to be distinguished from collecting all possible facts or
requesting an outside investigation), but “freely admitted” that he did no legal
research, did not consult outside counsel, and produced no written work product
at all. Doing so, in his view, was a “CYA tactic.”18 Nevertheless, Litvack concluded
that it was a “no-brainer” that Ovitz could not be terminated for cause, and he
relayed that view to Eisner.19 Eisner, in turn, “checked with almost anybody” (to be
distinguished from anyone he could name) and concluded there was no for-cause
option.20
It also appears that Litvack decided that approaching Ovitz to negotiate a
decreased exit package was not an option, despite the fact that the original agreement anticipated at least ﬁve years of employment. Litvack’s view was that Ovitz
would not agree, and any attempt to coerce him would be bad for Disney. Thus,
Litvack never proposed a for-cause termination or used it as a negotiating tool to, for
example, extract a lower payout. Indeed, the only negotiation over Ovitz’s termination seems to have been the rejection of extra beneﬁts that he requested.
Apparently not wanting to engage in a “public hanging,” at its November meeting,
the board renominated Ovitz to a three-year term.21 Immediately after-wards, a subset
of the board held an executive session to discuss the problems with Ovitz.
Unfortunately, there are no minutes that record evidence of the discussion.
Throughout this time, Ovitz apparently believed that the situation could still be
rectiﬁed.
After this board meeting and several conversations with board member Wilson,
Ovitz ﬁnally began to comprehend that his time at Disney was running out.
Thereafter, the negotiations, which were minimal, commenced. Although Ovitz
made many demands – including “keeping his seat on the board, obtaining a
consulting/advising arrangement with Disney, the continued use of an ofﬁce and
staff (but not on the Disney lot), continued health insurance and home security,
continued use of the company car and the repurchase of his plane” – the resulting
17
18
19
20
21

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 728.
at 729 n.264.
at 729 n.269 (citing Tr. 6114:24-10).
at 729 n.270 (citing Tr. 438:10-21).
at 730 n.276 (citing Tr. 377:21-3772:16).
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termination agreement provided that Ovitz would receive a payout consistent with
his original contract, which was a very substantial sum.22
In the midst of this, the Executive Performance Plan Committee (EPPC) met to
consider annual bonuses for executive ofﬁcers. At this meeting, Russell informed his
fellow board members of the impending termination and then recommended they
pay Ovitz his $7.5 million-dollar discretionary bonus, without – it appears – any
discussion of whether or why, despite Ovitz’s performance issues and impending
termination. Indeed, it appears that Russell may have incorrectly advised the board
that the bonus was contractually obligated despite the discretionary language in the
contract. No-one spoke up or contradicted Russell, including Litvack, who later said
he did not want to embarrass Russell (to be distinguished from hewing to his
ﬁduciary duties). Indeed, shortly thereafter, Russell and Litvack “sheepishly” admitted that the bonus was a mistake, noting that “it would be illogical and impossible to
justify any bonus one day and ﬁre [Ovitz] the next.”23 Then, they asked the EPPC to
rescind the bonus, which it did.
As discussions with Ovitz moved forward, discussions with individual board
members continued. When a termination was ﬁnally agreed upon, it was memorialized in a letter and announced publicly – without the board having seen the letter
or the terms. Apparently, the board members felt that Eisner had the power to make
the decision on his own, and Eisner did not attempt to contact board members by
phone to discuss it. The company did send copies of the termination letter to each
board member, but with no additional information. Litvack signed the letter, and he
did so only because no-one else was available.
The resulting payout to Ovitz was $130 million. Today, this is a substantial sum;
ten years ago, it was worth even more. The plaintiffs, concerned about a payout of
this size for what amounted to approximately fourteen months of problematic
employment, ﬁled the litigation that led to the trial and this review.

II

On appeal, we review the Chancery Court’s ﬁndings for errors in the application of
the law, while respecting its ﬁrst-hand decision-making with respect to the facts.
There are two sets of decisions by the board at issue: the OEA and non-fault
termination (NFT), as well as a series of decisions by Eisner, Litvack, and Ovitz.
We separate the latter group because these three people are ofﬁcers who are agents
of the company, and their role and choices are cabined differently than decisions of
the board. The Chancery Court found that neither the board nor the ofﬁcers
breached their ﬁduciary duties of care and loyalty, and we agree. Nevertheless, we

22
23

Id. at 732–33.
Id. at 739 n.350 (citing PTE 93).
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address the directors and ofﬁcers separately, clarifying that although the directors
may avail themselves of the business judgment rule, the ofﬁcers may not.
A
The plaintiffs argued that the board violated its ﬁduciary duties with respect to both
the OEA and the NFT. Delaware law deploys the business judgment rule to protect
business decisions where “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”24 These are rebuttable
presumptions, and to do so, the plaintiffs must prove that the board members were
not entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule, either because they did
not make a decision or because they acted in a grossly negligent or non-good faith
manner. Success would result in a burden shift to the defendants to prove their
actions were entirely fair to the corporation. The Court of Chancery rejected the
plaintiffs’ arguments; thus, burden shifting to the defendants did not occur.

There are alleged breaches of ﬁduciary duty in this case. The ﬁrst focuses on the duty
of care, which is subject to a gross negligence standard.25 The second is the duty to
act in good faith. There are at least three categories of actions that fall into the goodfaith space. The ﬁrst is where a ﬁduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation. The second is where the
ﬁduciary acts to violate applicable positive law. The third occurs when the ﬁduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for her duties. The ﬁrst two categories are not at issue here, and we hold
that the Chancery Court correctly found that the directors did not violate the third
one.
2
The plaintiffs’ arguments center on questions about whether the board had a legal
obligation to approve the OEA, the hiring of Ovitz, or the NFT. The answer, in this
case, is that the board was required to approve only one of these, the actual hiring of
Ovitz, which the Chancery Court found it did. Decisions about compensation at
Disney are relegated, under the bylaws, to the compensation committee. The
Chancery Court found that the appropriate bodies – the board for hiring and the
compensation committee for the OEA and NFT – did exercise their duties.
24
25

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
See Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., CIV. A. No. 7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 5, 1990) (“In the corporate context, gross negligence means ‘reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders’ or actions which are ‘without the
bounds of reason.’”).
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Moreover, having read the company’s governing documents, we ﬁnd that the
Chancery Court did not err in its interpretation of those documents. The board was
not required to approve either the compensation or the termination of Ovitz, and
compensation was the province of the compensation committee. In light of these
legal ﬁndings and given that we are bound by the lower court’s factual determinations, we do not reverse its decision with respect to the board and its good-faith
decision-making. That being said, we think it worth expounding further on the role
of the board, the privilege of serving as a director, and – even if it did not constitute a
breach of ﬁduciary duty – the ﬂawed process deployed at Disney.
3
As Section I of this opinion makes clear, Eisner set out to hire a friend of twenty-ﬁve
years as his potential successor at Disney. The framing for this decision was that
Eisner suffered a heart attack just months after stepping into the role of CEO, when
his predecessor was killed in a helicopter accident. Thus, the Disney Board was
faced in rapid succession with concerns about succession.
Although one member of the compensation committee was actively engaged in
the negotiations, the others appear to have been informed by phone, and even then
only when the deal was largely complete. The same is true for the board, which did
not question even the extraordinary sum. As stated previously, the board was not
obligated to do so. Moreover, under Delaware law, the board was entitled to rely on
the committee’s determinations, but that does not mean it was required to do so.
Indeed, the board had the right and the opportunity to question the committee’s
approach. It did not do so. The question is why. The answer appears to be, in part,
because of Eisner’s method of speaking with directors individually, which we regard
as a poor substitute for convening the full board and engaging in a discussion.26
The same is true of the NFT, which again Russell “negotiated” in his role as
Chair of the compensation committee. We stress the word “negotiated” here,
because there does not appear to have been any negotiation beyond the rejection
of Ovitz’s demands that exceeded the terms of the OEA. In reliance on Litvack,
Russell moved forward with an understanding that anything other than a no-fault
termination was a non-starter and simply put the terms into writing.
Note what did not happen here. The board did not vote on, or even meet to
discuss, the termination. The directors did not ask for an independent investigation
to determine whether a for-cause termination was possible. And even though the
compensation committee discussed the matter, it did not vote on it. Indeed, there
seems to have been some confusion among board members as to whether they
needed to vote or convene. Some thought that Eisner had the power to make the
decision on his own – although that power does not, itself, determine the board’s
26

See Broz, 663 A.2d at 1186.
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role; others apparently assumed that if they needed to be involved, Litvack would
have notiﬁed them.
In short, Ovitz was terminated without cause and without board discussion of the
facts and circumstances. Ovitz received a payout under his contract without an
internal investigation, seemingly without pushback and, instead, with the apparent
assumption by Litvack that doing so was required (and his testimony at trial
indicated that he has not changed his mind in the ensuing decade).27 Indeed, it
appears that Ovitz was terminated in much the same fashion that he was hired: by
Eisner and Russell, without consultation or engagement with others. It also appears
he was an unlikely ﬁt from the beginning.
For many unschooled in corporate law and ﬁduciary duties, this recitation of facts
would seem to lead to only one conclusion: this board, or at least Eisner and some
directors, must be liable. How could a ﬁduciary not ask more questions? How could
a ﬁduciary – or a group of them – allow Ovitz to leave with such outrageous
compensation? How could they not convene to address the matter?
The answer lies in this Court’s role, the law, and, we venture to say, the composition of the Disney Board. This Court does not tell ﬁduciaries how to do their jobs
better, desirous as that would be at times – including in this particular case.
Nevertheless, this is not the ﬁrst time that we have opined on one-off approaches,
but we hope that it is the last.28 To be clear, we think that individual phone calls
from a CEO in lieu of a telephonic board meeting, for example, are a very poor
substitute for an inclusive process that beneﬁts from the multiple views of an array of
directors – particularly a diverse array, as we discuss below. Yet, whatever we think
about the “process” here and the many ways in which we note below that it could
have been better, we will not ﬁnd liability for failing to meet an aspirational view –
even if it is our own – of what the best practices or ideal corporate governance
standards are.
As unsavory as some might ﬁnd this statement, particularly when it results in a
payment of $130 million for fourteen months of employment, it is the cornerstone of
Delaware law and a core strength of corporate governance more generally. Director
ﬁduciaries are granted wide latitude in business decision-making (to be distinguished
from the abdication of decision-making). There are, of course, limits on those
degrees of freedom. Directors must act faithfully and honestly on behalf of the
shareholders, and as long as they do so, their choices are allowed.
Shareholders do at times – as in this case – disagree with the decisions and
outcome. Reasonable people can do so, but reasonable disagreement is not our
standard, and nor should it be, particularly in hindsight. Recall that in a public
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Itself a very male approach. Allan Pease & Barbara Pease, Why Men Don’t Listen &
Women Can’t Read Maps: How We’re Different and What to Do About It 139 (2001)
(Men see asking for directions as “admitting they are wrong, and to be wrong is to fail”).
See Broz, 663 A.2d 1180.
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company like Disney, the shareholders have made a choice. In exchange for limited
liability, they have given up the right to manage, to make management decisions,
and to second-guess those decisions over time. There are many reasons for this tradeoff, not least of which is that risk and proﬁts are largely correlated and also are not
completely predictable. If we want business leaders to take risks and to innovate and
generate the proﬁts that shareholders desire, we must accept that shareholders will
not like every decision – particularly later, when the decision has proved ﬂawed.
Nevertheless, that is the choice shareholders make when they invest in companies.
Absent board member disloyalty, or gross negligence (which in most companies is
exculpated), liability is not available. The obligation of directors is to act in good
faith to make informed decisions that are untainted by self-interest. Without proof of
the failure to do so, the argument is really one about the choice of the decisionmakers or the wisdom of the decision, both of which will vary. On this point,
however, our law is clear: these areas are the purview of the directors – not the
shareholders, and not the court.
That being said, as is our standard approach, the Court does provide guidance
when a board falls short of best practices, and that certainly is the case here. The
imperial nature of Eisner, his approach to the board, and the decisions with respect to
the hiring and ﬁring of Ovitz are stunning. And even if board approval was not
required at all stages of the Ovitz saga, the decision to hire him was tied to succession
planning for Eisner, who had only recently (and as a result of a lack of a succession
plan) succeeded Wells. These are certainly the type of decisions about which the
board might well have been concerned and into which it might even have inserted
itself, despite the proverbial “nose in, ﬁngers out” adage. Therefore, in the hope of
improving future processes, we expound on the process and the opportunities for the
board, creating the possibility that the opinion might provide some guidance to other
ofﬁcers and directors of the many corporations subject to Delaware law.
Succession planning at the top is a key role of the board, yet this board appears not
to have engaged fully in the process. Instead, the board members deferred to Eisner
even when doing so resulted in his hiring an old friend with a compensation
package larger than that of any other public company ofﬁcer. One might pause
here to ask how that happened. The answer appears to be deference and a clublike
atmosphere, in which individual and/or side conversations with board members
were more common than convening the board for a thorough discussion.
In the case of the Disney Board, the decision to convene would in normal course
have been made by the chair – here, Eisner. Nevertheless, other board members
could have asked for a meeting. They were not required to do so ,legally; yet, we
pause to ask whether the process would have been improved if they had done so. We
think yes. We still ﬁrmly believe that good processes produce better substance. In
short, boards should take the time to do it right, in a thorough and inclusive manner.
Nevertheless, given the composition of the board, we are skeptical that process alone
would have produced better results. We address that point next.
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In general, boards have great ﬂexibility to organize their structure and to operate in a
manner that enables them to fulﬁll their legal duties and responsibilities. State
corporate law vests the ultimate power and duty to manage the business of the
corporation with the board of directors29 and permits the board to delegate tasks and
functions to committees.30 In the aftermath of Enron, however, the federal government intervened with requirements that at least some committees of the board be
comprised solely of independent directors.31 What the statutes and regulations do
not address, however, is the diversity of those directors – independent or not.
We turn to that point now, addressing the issue of diversity and elaborating on our
skepticism about whether process alone might have improved the Disney Board’s
decision-making. There were two boards here: the one at the time of the OEA, and
the one at the time of the NFT. Our analysis applies to both. The OEA board
comprised ﬁfteen people and the NFT board sixteen, only one of whom was a
woman. One woman on a board of ﬁfteen or sixteen people is simply not enough.
The research is very compelling: a board needs at least three women before gender
diversity brings results, and the reason for that requirement is inclusion.32 We
address diversity ﬁrst and then turn to inclusion. In doing so, we draw on the work
of multiple governance groups and a burgeoning area of empirical research. This
Court has often considered ﬁnance-related research in various valuation and other
contexts. Today, we expand the use of academic and corporate research to elaborate
on board composition. The facts of this case, and so many others, compel us to do
so, in the hope of shedding light on best practices related to shareholder value.33 To
be sure, at this time the work in this area is somewhat nascent; nevertheless, it
is compelling.
Diverse teams, including boards, perform better. Companies with greater diversity
have increased productivity and proﬁtability.34 Increasing the number of women
29
30
31
32

33

34

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003).
Id. at § 141(c).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
David A. Braun, Debra L. Brown & Vanessa Anastasopoulos, Women on Boards: Not Just the
Right Thing . . . But the “Bright” Thing, Conference Board of Canada Rep. 341-02, at 12 (2002)
(ﬁnding boards need a critical mass of women to change their behavior and performance:
“[R]esearch into attitudes of men towards women in management indicates that a critical mass
of 35 per cent may be necessary before male subjects’ attitudes change. At times, then, one, or
even two, women on an 11-person board may not be sufﬁcient to promote change, and even this
level of commitment may be only of a token nature.”).
See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (twelve out of
thirteen directors were male); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (ten male
directors).
Steven Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 Stan J.L. & Bus. Fin. 85, 86 (2000)
[hereinafter Diversity and the Boardroom] (“[T]he American business community is discovering that pursuing the opportunities inherent in American diversity enhances workforce productivity and thus increases proﬁtability.”); see also David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making
Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, Harv. Bus. Rev. 79 (1996).
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and minorities in the business-place and on the board, if done while developing
inclusion, produces an environment that is conducive for creative friction or positive
fact-based debates that result in innovation and growth.35
For example, a 1995 study by the Covenant Investment Group found that
businesses committed to promoting minority and women workers had higher
annual returns than companies without diversity.36 In fact, the returns for the diverse
ﬁrms were more than double those of their counterparts (18.3 percent versus 7.9
percent).37 The market’s reaction to ﬁrms recognized for their diversity gains is
consistent, revealing positive increases in stock prices for those companies compared
to others that are subject to sanction over discrimination.
The same is true for boards of directors. Recent research has shown that board
diversity can “enhance the bottom line.”38 Moreover, and key to this case, a
heterogeneous board can help to avoid the groupthink that is so perilous to creative
and effective decision-making.39 The concept of groupthink is rooted in the work of
Irving Janis, and despite it being more than thirty years old, many boards have failed
to heed the teachings. The simple fact is that people like people who are
like themselves. Although this tendency is not evil, it can be pernicious. This is
especially true in the boardroom, where if people have similar backgrounds
and attitudes, they are particularly likely to follow each other’s leads and fail to
engage in effective challenge and debate – the hallmarks of a diverse and inclusive
culture. In simple terms, groupthink occurs when people follow the leader,
even unknowingly.
We should not be surprised by this outcome. When people engage with people
similar to themselves, the conversation is easier, less stilted, more comfortable. That
comfort, however, is exactly what gets in the way of good outcomes. Discussions that
arise from different viewpoints tend to be more fact-based and are correlated with
better business outcomes.40 These discussions might feel like conﬂict,
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Diversity and the Boardroom, supra note 34, at 98 (“In this study, the Conference Board
concluded that board diversity can enhance shareholder value. In sum, ‘leading companies
are integrating diversity into corporate objectives with the belief that a diverse workforce can
help generate new ideas and help companies be more responsive to diverse markets.’”)); see
also Poppy Lauretta McLeod et al., Ethnic Diversity and Creativity in Small Groups, 27 Small
Grp. Res. 248, 251, 256–57 (1996) (ﬁnding that ethnically diverse workgroups, including Asian,
African, and Hispanic Americans, produced higher quality ideas than all-Anglo groups).
Fed. Glass Ceiling Comm’n, A Solid Investment: Making Full Use Of The Nation’s
Human Capital 5 (1995).
Id.
See The Conference Board, Report No. 1130-95-Rr, Diversity: Business Rationale and
Strategies (1995).
See Taylor H. Cox Jr., Cultural Diversity in Organizations: Theory, Research &
Practice (1994); Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink; A Psychological Study of
Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 192 (1972).
Orlando C. Richard, Racial Diversity, Business Strategy, and Firm Performance: A ResourceBased View, 43 Acad. Mgmt. J. 164 (2000) (“Proponents of diversity maintain that different
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but they actually produce the friction that is key to the power and beneﬁts of
diversity.41
No doubt this is the reason that institutional investors increasingly call for more
diversity in companies and in the boardroom.42 Gender-diverse boards are less likely
to suffer from groupthink. They are more likely to consider alternatives, enrich the
quality of ideas, and provoke livelier boardroom discussions, all of which leads to
enhanced decision-making.43 Thus, the sense of infallibility and excessive optimism
associated with groupthink (and which arguably was evident in Ovitz’s hiring) is less
likely to occur.44 In part this is true because “women are less affected than men by
the over-optimism bias.”45 And it appears that more women means more accountability: boards with three or more women are more likely to adopt policies that guard
against self-serving behavior, which is rooted in conﬂicts of interest and ethical

41

42

43

44

45

opinions provided by culturally diverse groups make for better-quality decisions . . . and appear
useful for making valuable judgments in novel situations. Heterogeneity in decision-making
and problem-solving styles produces better decisions through the operation of a wider range of
perspectives and a more thorough critical analysis of issues.”); see also Cox, supra note 39;
Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Minority Dissent as a Stimulant to Group Performance, in
Productivity and Process in Groups 95 (Stephen Worchel, Wendy Wood & Jeffry A.
Simpson eds., 1992); Poppy L. McLeod & Sharon A. Lobel, The Effects of Ethnic Diversity on
Idea Generation in Small Groups, Ann. Meeting of the Acad. of Mgmt. (1992).
See, e.g., Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance
Management Publications, Mgmt. Publ’ns (2003), https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/management_
pubs/13 (citing Cecily Cannan Selby, From Male Locker Room to Co-ed Board Room:
A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, in Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International
Challenges and Opportunities 239 (Robert J. Burke & Mary C. Mathis eds., 2000): “Selby . . .
interviewed women board members from top U.S. ﬁrms and observed that by including gender
diversity on their boards ﬁrms concomitantly included diversity in other experiences and
values. She notes that the ‘questioning culture’ of a board can be inﬂuenced, in a positive
respect, by having women board members.”).
Since the 1990s, institutional investors including TIAA-CREF, one of the nation’s largest
nstitutional investors, and CalPERS, the largest public pension fund in the U.S., have been
emphasizing the need for directors with diverse experience. See Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77
St. John’s L. Rev. 837, 847 (2003). TIAA-CREF issued a “Policy Statement on Corporate
Governance” in the early 1990s, which expressed the desire for more diversity in the boardroom, and in 2000, TIAA-CREF expanded on that statement by saying that diversity in
“experience, gender, race and age” should be considered as a director qualiﬁcation. See TIAACREF, Policy Statement on Corporate Governance (March 2000). Additionally, CalPERS
stated in 1998 that “[w]ith each director nomination recommendation, the board [should]
consider[] the mix of director characteristics, experiences, diverse perspectives and skills that is
most appropriate for the company.” See Cal. Pub. Employee Ret. Sys., Corporate Governance
Core Principles & Guidelines: The United States 6 (Apr. 13, 1998).
See Lorin Letendre, The Dynamics of the Boardroom, 18 Acad. Mgmt. Exec. (1993–2005) at
101–04 (Feb. 2004).
See Warren E. Watson, Kamalesh Kumar & Larry K. Michaelsen, Cultural Diversity’s Impact
on Interaction Process and Performance: Comparing Homogenous and Diverse Task Groups, 36
Acad. Mgmt. J. 590 (June 1993).
Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1233,
1307 (2003).
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lapses – thus increasing accountability.46 Further, as a recent Catalyst report reveals,
companies with the highest representation of women on their top management
teams had a 35.1 percent higher return on equity and a 34 percent higher total return
to shareholders than companies with the lowest female representation.47 Given the
ﬁduciary duties of directors, we are hard pressed to see a downside to adding more
women to boards. Indeed, board diversity appears to be a proverbial “no-brainer.”
Of course, diversity can also produce differences of opinion that may result in
arguments. In the words of the CEO of Bell Atlantic, “[i]f everybody in the room is
the same, you’ll have a lot fewer arguments and a lot worse answers.”48 This view is
conﬁrmed by the research, which indicates that companies that “effectively manage
diversity” can achieve improvements in their human resource efﬁciency, marketing
effectiveness, and innovation and creativity.49 What does effectively managing diversity mean? At least in part, it means that the boardroom operates in an inclusive
manner, where all members feel a sense of belonging, a role in the mission, and a
say in the governance.50 That is partly why the research indicates that to access the
value of having women on the board, there should be a minimum of three women.51
These numbers can help to prevent tokenism, where some board members are
treated differently from others, and can create more room for the comfortable
expression of ideas, which is a form of inclusion. The numbers foster participation,
which is the key to unleashing the power of diversity.52
In short, the Disney Board had three diverse members, but because it did not
operate in an inclusive manner, it squandered the power of that diversity.53 Recall,
for example, that the two diverse members of the compensation committee were not
included in discussions. Yet, to access the creative friction and corporate metrics that

46
47
48

49

50

51

52

53

Braun et al., supra note 32.
The Bottom Line: Connecting Corporate Performance and Gender Diversity, Catalyst (2004).
Geoffrey Colvin, The 50 Best Companies for Asians, Blacks, & Hispanics, Fortune Mag. (July
19, 1999).
See Taylor Cox, Jr. & Carol Smolinski, Managing Diversity and Glass Ceiling Initiatives as
National Economic Imperatives, U.S. Dep’t of Labor Glass Ceiling Comm’n (Jan. 31, 1994).
Frederick A. Miller & Judith H. Katz, The Inclusion Breakthrough: Unleashing the
Real Power of Diversity (2002) (arguing that leveraging the power of diversity requires
building an inclusive culture).
Judy B. Rosener, America’s Competitive Secret: Utilizing Women as a Management
Strategy 120–21 (1995) (ﬁnding that a single board member is often dismissed as a token, and
two are not enough to be taken seriously, but three female board members gives the board a
critical mass).
See Diversity and the Boardroom, supra note 34, at 119 (citing 1998 AMA Survey Senior
Management Teams: Proﬁles and Performance, Am. Mgmt. Ass’n 7 (1998) (“[T]he
Association concluded that ‘it is not the predominance of any one group, but rather the
participation of numerous diverse members that seemed to lead to superior performance.’”)).
Susan E. Jackson, Consequences of Group Composition for the Interpersonal Dynamics of
Strategic Issue Processing, 8 Advances in Strategic Mgmt. 345, 370–71 (1992) (arguing that
ineffective norms and processes can squander the potential beneﬁts of diversity by stiﬂing the
expression of disagreement).
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diversity produces, the board needed to embed inclusive debates and discussions
into its culture.
There are some simple rules to consider that might improve boardroom practices:
No interrupting; everyone speaks once before anyone speaks twice; and all ideas are
on the table before they are critiqued. These might sound like the basic rules of
kindergarten, but they are not.54 They are the norms of good conversation and
debate. 55 They are also the norms of participative boards, those “characterized by
high CEO and board power, discussion, debate, and disagreement,” and they are
associated with higher numbers of female directors.56 According to Catherine Daily,
“Importantly, participative boards [are also] signiﬁcantly associated with higher
perceived and objective company performance.”57
Indeed, we venture to say that if this board had beneﬁted from the power of
gender diversity and an inclusive culture, the outcome might have been different in
several ways. First, the board might not have hired Ovitz – at least not without
discussion and debate. Second, it might not have paid him more than any other
public company ofﬁcer at the time. Third, it might not have granted him an array of
embarrassing perquisites. Fourth, it might not have agreed to a no-fault termination
with a huge payout. Fifth, although we are tongue-in-cheek here, the board might
have kept minutes, which could have been extremely helpful in this process and
potentially saved considerable expense. And sixth, the board might have engaged in
better and more conscientious practices that would have allowed it to win dismissal
on the front end, thus saving both the board and Delaware taxpayers the costs of
multiple briefs, considerable discovery, a trial, and this second appeal.
Consider the following situations implicating questions of diversity. The OEA
Compensation Committee had four members, two of whom were men of color. In
addition to Russell and Watson, who were discussed previously and both of whom
played actual roles in the Ovitz compensation process, were Ignacio Lozano, a
Mexican American, and Sidney Poitier, a Bahamian American and former client of
Ovitz. Neither Lozano nor Poitier were invited to play a role or included in the
process, except for a brief call at the end to apprise them of the existing decisions.
Indeed, Russell ﬁrst called Poitier the day before the OEA was signed and the press
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Robert Fulghum, All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten: Uncommon
Thoughts on Common Things (1988).
Emily Post & Peggy Post, Emily Post’s Etiquette (17th ed. 2004).
Catherine M. Daily et al., A Decade of Corporate Women: Some Progress in the Boardroom,
None in the Executive Suite, 20 Strategic Mgmt. J. 93, 97 (1999).
Id. Indeed, this Court deploys norms to build its own inclusive culture, ensure that input from
all members factors into outcomes, and avoid our own versions of one-ofﬁng. See David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127 (1997)
(analyzing the Delaware Supreme Court’s norm of unanimous opinions and the practices that
have been put in place to protect this norm, including avoiding conversations between
individual justices – as opposed to the group – about pending opinions).
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release issued, and notiﬁed Lozano only after the press release went out.58 Moreover,
the trial testimony indicated that neither person of color was told of Crystal’s
concerns about the pay package or made privy to the analysis. Indeed, prior to the
phone calls, Russell and Watson discussed, ﬁnalized, and presented the OEA
without sharing Crystal’s concerns or any others. Although Lozano and Poitier
could have pushed back on the decision, the lack of an inclusive process made it
less likely that they would do so. It is not therefore surprising that they did not. For
example, when Russell and Watson presented their ﬁndings and conclusions for a
vote, half of the committee had already drafted and approved of the OEA. Arguably,
Russell and Watson did not value Poitier and Lozano’s opinions and marginalized
them as members, making it harder for either of them to question – let alone
challenge – the preexisting decisions. The two men may have been assimilated,
but they were not included.59 Indeed, marginalization and tokenism result in this
type of disempowerment. Participation, not predominance, is what produces the
effects of diversity; and inclusion, which certainly did not happen here, is vital.60
Everything we have just said applies also to Bower, an African American and the
lone female on the Disney Board. She was not on the compensation committee.
Even if she had been, it is unlikely, given the treatment of Lozano and Poitier, that
she would have been consulted or included in any way. Indeed, her testimony
reveals that she, too, was a marginalized board member. She was not an actor or
Hollywood powerhouse. She was the headmaster of the local prep school that
Eisner’s children attended. One might even argue that, given her background, other
board members might have believed she was unlikely to know much about these
sorts of employment contracts or compensation agreements; yet, if included in
discussions, she might have had a sense about potential public reaction to the
enormity of the compensation and exit packages.
A more diverse board, operating in an inclusive manner, might well have called
formal meetings of both the compensation committee and the board to review
compensation and termination decisions. As the research indicates, inclusive meetings with a diverse array of directors are likely to result in attention to facts and
objective evidence – spreadsheets and data, for example – and are therefore more
likely to result in better decision-making.61 Inclusive meetings could have beneﬁted
58

59

60
61

Indeed, both Lozano and Poitier testiﬁed as to their approval of the hiring of Ovitz, but neither
mentioned any discussion as to their opinion – or if they were even asked – about the terms of
Ovitz’s compensation package. This signals a lack of inclusion in the “important” decisions.
Nicola Pless & Thomas Maak, Building an Inclusive Diversity Culture: Principles, Processes and
Practice, 54 J. Bus. Ethics. 129, 130 (2004) (noting that assimilation results in minorities and
women underperforming because they are not heard or included and thus cannot add value to
corporate performance).
See Diversity and the Boardroom, supra note 34, at 119.
See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. Pers’lity & Soc. Psych.
597 (2006) (ﬁnding heterogenous groups outperformed homogenous groups in every
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from creative friction, and they might have checked the egos and optimism that
infected the “process” that did occur. Indeed, it is possible that someone might even
have raised the fact that the NFT provisions could apply in the eventuality that Ovitz
failed spectacularly and quickly.
Unfortunately, in 2006, despite considerable conversation about and calls for
diversity, the failure to address it does not amount to a breach of a board’s ﬁduciary
duty, at least not of the loyalty variety. And, as previously stated, this board was
protected by an exculpation clause that relieved it from liability for breaches of
anything less. Thus, we are left with citing the evidence and acting within our role as
an educator for boards about process and power, in the hope that change will occur,
and with the goal of creating space that would – in the future – create the possibility
of liability if ignored.

B
Before we conclude, we need to address Ovitz, Eisner, and Litvack. All three of
these men are ofﬁcers, and although we agree with the Chancery Court that they are
not liable, we want to clarify what their duties were and the fact that the business
judgment rule simply does not apply to them. In short, ofﬁcers are different
from directors.
Ofﬁcers of a corporation, like directors, owe ﬁduciary duties. Yet, unlike directors,
ofﬁcers are agents and are not subject to exculpation. They are also not subject to
the business judgment rule, which is a common law invention designed to encourage the board in its risk-taking and decision-making, but which we have not
previously applied to corporate ofﬁcers. Cases against corporate ofﬁcers are rare, in
part because this state clariﬁed only recently its jurisdiction over them, and in part
because the actions often at issue in these sorts of cases are board-level decisions.
We begin with Ovitz. We agree with the Chancery Court that Ovitz did not
become a ﬁduciary until he signed the OEA. One might ask whether Ovitz might
have thought about whether and how he wanted to enter Disney – and whether a
package of the magnitude at issue here would send the types of signals that it appears
he sent after starting his job. Nonetheless, regardless of the privilege inherent in his
negotiations for the OEA and the NFT, Ovitz assumed no ﬁduciary duties to the
corporation until he was actually an employee. Thus, he was free to use his privilege
to negotiate for an outrageous package, and he did so.
Plaintiffs also argue that Ovitz violated his duties in accepting the NFT provisions
of the OEA when he was terminated. We do not agree. Ovitz did not make this
decision, did not like this decision, and did not see it coming. Once the decision was
made, Ovitz was entitled to the terms of the OEA, including the amounts in the
deliberation measure, including: number of case facts discussed, number of factual inaccuracies, number of uncorrected inaccurate statements, and amount of “missing” evidence cited).
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NFT. His comeuppance, if any, has been in the very public exposure of his
inadequacy – if not incompetence, the trial testimony probing those issues in some
detail, and the resulting humiliation. Although it does not provide the plaintiffs with
damages, it will have to sufﬁce.
With respect to Eisner, our holding is somewhat different. We agree with the
Chancery Court that however imperial and privileged, Eisner’s decisions do not
amount to a breach of loyalty, nor were they lacking in good faith, however hindered
by his ego they might have been. Further, even if we were to agree with the plaintiffs
about any lack of care here, Disney’s indemniﬁcation clause, which covers ofﬁcers,
applies.
Finally, our holding also applies, for various reasons, to Litvack. First, his main
roles – other than acting with the same considerable privilege of his male counterparts – were conﬁned to the NFT and the discretionary bonus. In making his
determination that Ovitz could not be terminated with cause, Litvack appears to
have relied largely on his own sense of the law. It should be noted that Litvack was a
well-pedigreed individual with considerable legal experience. Although many other
lawyers might not have had the ego to consult themselves, we cannot fault him for
doing so. Indeed, if we were to ﬁnd liability for this sort of ego-based decisionmaking, we would likely have to ﬁnd liability in most of the decisions we review.
Moreover, whatever the possible ﬂaws here, the lower court found that the NFT was
well within the purview of the decision-makers, including Litvack, and we do not
disagree.62
Nevertheless, we address this issue to lay to rest confusion about whether and
when the business judgment rule applies (to the board, but not to ofﬁcers) and to
clarify the point that ofﬁcers are agents, with their own ﬁduciary duties that are
distinct from those of the board. Given the indemniﬁcation provisions, however,
liability does not extend to the ofﬁcers in this case – absent a ﬁnding that they failed
to act in good faith. The Chancery Court did not so ﬁnd, and we do not ﬁnd fault
with its reasoning.63
The judgment of the Chancery Court is afﬁrmed.
It is so ordered.
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Because the $7.5 million-dollar bonus awarded to Ovitz prior to his termination was later
rescinded, there was no harm done and thus no basis for damages to be awarded. See In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 45 n.34 (Del. 2006).
No matter how wasteful the payout of the NFT may appear, the decision to payout the terms of
the NFT was not waste. Waste will be established in the rare “unconscionable case where
directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.” Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
263 (Del. 2000). Here, the payout of a contractually obligated amount was not waste.
Additionally, the approval of the NFT provisions was not wasteful, because despite the large
payout sum, the terms had a rational business purpose: to persuade Ovitz to join Disney. Thus,
this claim of waste also fails.

